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Abstract. While a lot has changed in Internet security in the last 10
years, a lot has stayed the same – such as the use of alphanumeric pass-
words. Passwords remain the dominant means of authentication on the
Internet, even in the face of significant problems related to password for-
getting and theft. In fact, despite large numbers of proposed alternatives,
we must remember more passwords than ever before. Why is this? Will
alphanumeric passwords still be ubiquitous in 2019, or will adoption of
alternative proposals be commonplace? What must happen in order to
move beyond passwords? This note pursues these questions, following a
panel discussion at Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2009.
1 Introduction
Passwords have served us well for many years, but they suffer from a num-
ber of problems that suggest their reign should be coming to an end. Users
often choose weak passwords, making guessing and brute-force dictionary and
exhaustive attacks feasible. Users also frequently forget passwords, necessitating
expensive customer support calls or automated backup authentication schemes
(often involving challenge questions, which may be even weaker forms of authen-
tication). Because of these cognitive challenges, users frequently store copies of
their passwords (in places vulnerable to attackers), and use the same password
for multiple systems. Users also can have their passwords stolen through phish-
ing, social engineering, man-in-the-middle, and keylogging attacks. The static
nature of passwords then allows repeated unauthorized access by attackers.
Even with all of these problems, passwords remain the dominant method for
access control. There are reasons to be optimistic about change, however. The
popular press has frequent stories about identity theft and fraud, and there ap-
pears to be increasing awareness, even among unsophisticated users, about pass-
word issues. Few consumer security problems get more attention than banking
passwords. Many banks have altered their authentication mechanisms, suggest-
ing a willingness to adapt and go beyond traditional passwords. There has also
been a surge of activity in proposing alternatives to password authentication,
both in the academic research literature and the startup scene. As economic
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gain has emerged as a primary motivation for computer security exploits, there
should be increased motivation to move beyond simple passwords. On the other
hand, despite these signs of real need and a desire for change, adoption of au-
thentication alternatives has been very slow.
In this note we consider possible reasons why we are moving so slowly in
replacing problematic password systems, how we might accelerate the progress,
and where we might be in ten years. Rather than focus on the specifics of par-
ticular technologies, we prefer to consider forces that drive or retard progress,
including technology, economics, and usability.
2 Some Proposed Alternatives to Basic Passwords
Numerous authentication alternatives and enhancements to basic passwords have
been proposed, each with its own advocates. Two-factor authentication schemes,
where the user demonstrates possession of a physical token, reduce or eliminate
a number of problems associated with passwords. These schemes have seen rela-
tively limited use, other than for very high value accounts, because of usability
issues, cost of tokens and support (including replacement), the need for server
changes, and the expanding key-chain problem (where users require a separate
token for each account). Cell phones and various types of trusted mobile devices
have been suggested as a means of achieving a two-factor scheme using a device
that users already carry. Public-key infrastructure with client-side certificates
offers significantly stronger authentication than passwords, but it has achieved
very limited deployment. Biometrics, for example in the form of fingerprints
or iris scans, are used in some secure settings, but there are unresolved issues
around deployment, privacy, and authentication from untrusted hardware.
Alternatives that claim to preserve the usability and convenience of passwords
while overcoming their most serious shortcomings are frequently proposed. For
example, graphical passwords (e.g., see Chiasson [5, Chapter 2] for a recent
survey) offer the possibility of improved strength, memorability, and usability.
Combinations of text and graphical passwords [15] may also offer advantages.
In addition to proposals to replace passwords, researchers and developers
have explored techniques to alleviate some of the threats associated with pass-
word use. On-screen keyboards, for example, attempt to evade password-stealing
key-loggers by having the user enter the password using a graphically displayed
keyboard. While this helps against malware that logs keystrokes, it is vulnerable
to more sophisticated logging malware and browser plug-ins. Phishing toolbars
[13] attempt to alert users before they enter credentials on low reputation web-
sites.
Techniques such as SiteKey [2] have been deployed by a number of major
financial institutions; these attempt to have the user authenticate the site only
after verifying that a personalized image is present. Another recent innovation,
EV SSL (extended validation SSL) certificates [4], require that the grantee (i.e.,
the web-site) undergo greater vetting from the Certifying Authority. The real
benefit of these new technologies remains questionable. Studies have shown that
users largely ignore the absence of a SiteKey image and EV SSL indicators [18,
20]. The need for automated password reset mechanisms has sparked interest in
systematic analysis of challenge questions and backup authentication [17].
3 Barriers to Moving Beyond Passwords
There are many barriers to moving beyond ubiquitous alphanumeric passwords.
Diversity of requirements. Passwords are used to protect a wide range of
services, from financial transactions to free webmail and social networking sites.
No authentication alternative proposed to date is suitable for all of these services,
splintering the target markets and weakening the case for adoption of any one
new technology. The best solution often depends heavily on specific use cases.
Competing technical proposals. As noted above, there is no shortage of pro-
posed alternatives to basic password authentication. Each has different advan-
tages, disadvantages, and costs, all competing for mindshare.
Competing goals among stakeholders. Different views of costs and benefits
are held by web sites, browser manufacturers, vendors of anti-virus software and
security technologies, industry standards bodies, governments, and end-users. In
some cases, an organization mandating “stronger” authentication may risk cus-
tomer defection to competitors who continue with “more usable” authentication
technologies (such as basic passwords).
Scarcity of loss data. There is a scarcity of data on the scale, frequency,
nature and financial impact of password loss incidents, as well as on the number
and nature of adversaries. For example there are orders of magnitude difference
between various estimates of phishing losses [11]. When password loss does occur,
we seldom have good data on whether phishing, social engineering, man-in-the-
middle or keylogging was responsible. It is difficult to “fix” security without
reliable measurements of what is broken, especially when the solutions are not
cheap or easy. Even with relevant loss-related data, it may be difficult for an
organization to make trade-off decisions about known loss incidents caused by
weak password authentication versus the unknown costs of possible customer
defection and increased support.
User reluctance and usability. Stronger authentication often requires addi-
tional user effort and buy-in. It is notoriously hard to motivate users about “bet-
ter security.” Solutions that concentrate on making passwords non-guessable risk
increasing the forgetting problem, while solutions that concentrate on the for-
getting problem can increase the risk of guess-ability. Solutions that concentrate
on lost and stolen passwords risk introducing additional costs and complexity.
Individual control of end-user platforms. Online merchants as well as service
providers largely rely on leveraging existing software and platforms (e.g., browser
and operating system) which end-users have individually obtained at their own
expense and preference. This limits alternatives which require specific platforms
or software deployments. For example, in the U.S., banks apparently cannot
force users to secure their own end-systems, leaving a big technical challenge.
No single organization can impose a solution. The combination of the above
factors, plus a decentralized and global Internet that no one organization owns
or controls, has resulted in a lack of consensus on what we need to do to move
beyond alphanumeric passwords. Anderson et al. [1] discuss related issues in their
report on the broader topic of barriers, incentives, and failures in the market for
network and information security within the European Union.
4 Moving Beyond Passwords
Having reviewed barriers to making changes, we next consider, through a series
of questions, what it will take to move beyond passwords.
Q1: Are any of the problems with current passwords true show-stoppers?
One viewpoint is that the problem is not as large as imagined. End-users
are comfortable using weak passwords and asking for password resets when they
forget them. It is unclear how much password strength helps if phishing and key-
logging are the main threats [9]. Parties who do suffer pain from the present use
of passwords, as direct financial losses, management cost, or usability, apparently
are either: (1) not suffering enough to trigger a switch to alternatives, or (2) not
in a position to evoke change. Some service providers may believe that to keep
costs down it is better to minimize direct contact with customers (e.g., avoiding
support calls) than to deploy stronger authentication.
A different viewpoint is that there are big problems, which are either hidden,
unknown, or knowingly under-stated. Surprisingly little is actually known about
large-scale usage of passwords on the Internet. For example, despite conditions
in banking user agreements (e.g., in Canada) which stipulate that users must not
re-use passwords across applications [14], a study of the Internet password habits
of half a million browser toolbar users [8] indicates that cross-site password re-
use is very common. A related problem, largely unstudied to date, is the impact
on memorability and usability when end-users must remember many different
passwords.
While passwords and credit card numbers are largely transported over SSL
today, the roll-out of EV SSL certificates [12, 20] apparently complicates the task
for end-users already struggling with interpreting the previous browser security
cues (e.g., lock icon, https indicator). This may be viewed as negative progress
in the usability of certificate interfaces over the past fifteen years.
One emerging use of passwords in Europe and Canada is PINs related to
chip-cards (smartcards) – cards with embedded micro-processors. In the U.K.
“chip and PIN” intiative [7], signatures authorizing financial transactions are
replaced by consumer entry of a 4-digit PIN. The vendor motivation for adopt-
ing the new system is an off-loading of liability. Users become responsible for all
approved transactions where authorization relied on a correct PIN, whereas for
traditional magnetic-stripe technology with signatures, users are liable for losses
in disputed transactions only if they are shown to be negligent or involved in
fraud. (From a legal perspective in countries like the U.K., liability related to
signature forgery falls on the relying party. PIN-authorized transactions appar-
ently fall outside the scope of such statutory protection, and banks assert that
use of a PIN implies cardholder negligence.) Consumers may be particularly un-
happy to learn this detail of the new technology in light of prior demonstrations
[6] that chip and PIN readers can leak user PINs.
Q2: What major security improvements have been adopted in the past 15 years
by banks, related to online banking security and passwords?
In an attempt to reduce password theft (i.e., phishing attacks), online banks
are starting to employ site verification schemes. For example, SiteKey [2] asks
users to assign a unique image to their login credentials, and to only proceed
with a login if their image is displayed back to them. An empirical study [18] sug-
gests, however, that users will still enter their banking passwords when presented
with fraudulent messages claiming that the image authentication server is down
(although these results may be problematic [16]). Sitekey may be more effective
as marketing effort (users feel more secure) than as a security enhancement.
SSL continues to be used for protecting passwords for countless online bank-
ing sites, and for protecting credit card numbers during online transactions. For
the latter, security “enhancements” such as the third party verifier services Ver-
ified By Visa and Mastercard SecureCode have emerged. During a registration
phase, a user must enter the 3-digit sequence printed on the back of their credit
card along with other personal information, and choose a (new) password. On
subsequent online card usage, the verifier service requests this password, but not
the 3-digit code. (Oddly, some vendor sites request the 3-digit sequence be re-
entered, before transferring the user on to the verifier service.) Of course, once
such a 3-digit number is input to the Internet, its security value erodes. Users
trained to do so make easy prey for phishers; and, this approach gives end-users
the privilege of remembering yet another password. Some banks in Canada simi-
larly now require or recommend a second (extra) password be used for higher risk
financial transactions. Whether to consider these as “improvements” is unclear.
Banks are starting to deploy dynamic challenge questions and two-factor au-
thentication. Orthogonal to these is a move towards authentication of specific
transactions. Bank of America’s optional SafePass, for example, requires that
customers register a mobile phone that can receive text messages that contain
one-time authentication codes [3]. It will be interesting to monitor the success of
this program, its support costs, and how often people lose or change cell phone
numbers, or claim they don’t have their cell phone handy. Software implemen-
tations of one-time passcodes generators are receiving renewed interest – e.g., a
new iPhone application [10] supports one-time passwords for AOL, eBay, and
PayPal. Ideally, transaction authorization or transaction integrity systems will
cryptographically bind one-time authorization codes with specific transaction
details.
Several proposals have been made for one-time passwords for credit cards
(e.g., [19]). Deployment examples include the American Express Private Pay-
ments scheme and Discover Card’s Secure Online Account Numbers. Similar
schemes allow end-users to dynamically generate one-time card numbers for on-
line purchases (e.g., Citicards). While a promising direction, adoption has been
limited, perhaps due to lack of promotion or low consumer motivation due to loss
limits on credit cards. The main development for improving credit card transac-
tion security appears to be in transaction authentication and back-end (system
side) profiling. One might conclude that no password alternative yet proposed
has better cost-benefit attributes, or that banks’ existing back-end mechanisms
are cheaper than anything involving customers more directly.
Q3: If we have made little progress on password authentication – perhaps the
simplest Internet security problem – are researchers and security vendors fooling
themselves if we think that our technologies solve real-world problems?
While passwords seem to be a simple technology, it seems unfair to suggest
that authentication is the simplest Internet security problem. Indeed, many of
the most difficult problems in Internet security can be reduced to authentication,
and when we say authentication we often mean authorization.
No doubt, some researchers fail to do proper research into discovering the
true real-world requirements, and fail to understand that in practice, complete
solutions are needed. No doubt, some security vendors fail to build products
that ideally meet needs, and under-estimate deployment and inter-operability
issues with products. The economic barriers and incentives involved in security
solutions are only recently receiving attention. Evidently, the solutions proposed
so far would cost more than the problem, and good back-end transaction moni-
toring may mean that this state will remain for some period of time.
In addition, academics and researchers often have personal biases and over-
position their own proposals as full solutions, in part due to a competitive process
which often requires marketing in order for papers to be accepted for publication.
Given the investment in passwords, both in infrastructure and in user acceptance
and understanding, it is very difficult to see partial solutions displacing the in-
cumbent technology. For example, it is hard to justify investment in a proposal
that addresses phishing, but not key-logging, or one that helps when the user
logs in from a particular machine, but not when roaming on other machines.
This means that many proposals that have great merit and solve real problems
do not achieve traction because they don’t solve all the problems, or fail to solve
a sufficient fraction of the problems relative to the extra costs.
Q4: Why have North America and Europe chosen different paths in online bank-
ing password authentication to date?
Many European banks use one-time password lists for authentication in on-
line banking, while simple passwords (with presumably more back-end profiling)
are more common in the U.S. and Canada. It is not clear to us which of the two
is the better path. One possible reason for the difference is perhaps Europeans
are more familiar/comfortable with real-world authentication and tolerate ex-
tra effort as required for security; passports are more common in Europe, for
historical reasons.
It may also be that the differences are largely due to regulations related
to liability for losses. In North America, banks have been largely responsible for
covering losses unless there is evidence of fraud by the customer. This reduces the
motivation for users to invest time and energy in better authentication. There
may also be less customer loyalty in the U.S., with banking customers more
likely to switch banks for competitive reasons; this might make banks reluctant
to implement any changes that increase the costs or complexity for the customer.
5 Accelerating Progress and Predictions for 2019
Perhaps significant progress cannot be made without a major economic event or
catastrophe that creates a tipping point – that is, only when the direct losses re-
lated to the use of simple passwords are large enough will there be a ground-swell
of adoption of more efficient solutions or advanced technologies. On the other
hand, an innovative, cost-effective solution may emerge and trigger widespread
adoption, like the relatively inexpensive, conceptually simple, SSL in browsers.
More government regulation may be required, with serious penalties when
use of weak technologies results in losses. The players with power (e.g., finan-
cial institutions) prefer to shift liability and responsibility for losses onto those
without power (e.g., the customers). This is a significant problem if powerless
customers are experiencing real hardships in the form of indirect costs, such as
time lost and mental stress, when security breaches occur. If the direct losses,
suffered by banks, are far smaller than these indirect costs, endured by cus-
tomers, there will be little impetus for banks to drive change. It may be that
only government regulations will address such a difference in power. Anderson
et al. [1] suggest numerous policy changes involving additional regulations.
Where will we be in ten years? Will passwords be completely replaced by
other authentication methods, or will we still be struggling with the same is-
sues? Likely any adoption of stronger authentication technologies will be grad-
ual and that decisions to deploy new schemes will be based on economic factors
such as the value of transactions and the nature of the risks. Low-value, casual
transactions may well still use ordinary passwords in ten years or even twenty.
We expect that economics and usability are far more likely than technological
developments to be the primary drivers of authentication changes. As mentioned
earlier, until the direct economic losses become large enough, there may be lit-
tle incentive to make changes that could lead to problems in support costs or
usability. Also, in the absence of tools to measure the economic losses and the
effectiveness of new technological proposals, we expect the adoption of password
alternatives to continue to be difficult to justify.
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